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When ﬁrms borrow from multiple concentrated creditors such as banks they ap-
pear to dierentiate their allocation of borrowing. In this paper, we put forward
hypotheses for this borrowing pattern based on incomplete contract theories and
test them using a sample of small U.S. ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms with more valu-
able, more redeployable, and more homogeneous assets dierentiate borrowing more
sharply across their concentrated creditors. We also ﬁnd that borrowing dieren-
tiation is inversely related to restructuring costs and positively related to ﬁrms’
informational transparency. This evidence supports the predictions of incomplete
contract theories: the structure of credit relationships appears to be used as a device
to discipline creditors and entrepreneurs, especially during corporate reorganizations.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
When ﬁrms borrow from multiple concentrated lenders, such as banks,1 they appear to dier-
entiate their allocation of borrowing in the sense that they do not obtain equal amounts from
several lenders but rather they systematically borrow more from some of the lenders. In Table
1, we display the borrowing pattern of the U.S. ﬁrms in the National Survey of Small Business
Finance conducted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Small
Business Administration (pooled 1993 and 1998 survey waves). The table shows that ﬁrms
that borrow from multiple institutions substantially dierentiate their borrowing shares. For
example, among ﬁrms with two lenders, the ﬁrst lender (the one granting the largest share of
loans) provides on average 76.5 percent of total credit and, among ﬁrms with three lenders, the
ﬁrst provides on average 65.1 percent of total credit. These ﬁgures far exceed the 50 percent
and 33 percent shares that would be observed if - given the number of lenders - borrowing
was allocated evenly. Although we lack detailed ﬁgures, there is also evidence of dierentiated
borrowing in other countries. In Italy, for example, 97% of the manufacturing ﬁrms in the 2001
Mediocredito-Capitalia survey choose multiple, dierentiated borrowing and, among ﬁrms that
have four banks (the sample median number of banks), the ﬁrst bank provides on average more
than 40% of total credit. Dierentiated borrowing is also widespread in countries with strong
bank-ﬁrm relationships, like Germany and Japan (Aoki and Patrick, 1994; Edwards and Fisher,
1994).
Despite a growing interest in ﬁrms’ debt structure, the literature has largely neglected this
issue. As we better argue below, some studies have focussed on the optimal number of creditors,
but they have treated creditors as symmetric. Other studies have focussed on the optimal con-
tractual links between ﬁrms and their multiple concentrated creditors (see, e.g., Diamond, 1993).
Little attention has been devoted to explaining why a ﬁrm allocates its borrowing dierentially
across multiple concentrated lenders, thereby letting them have a dierent role and inﬂuence
over its business.
The objective of this paper is to address this issue. In the ﬁrst part of the paper (Section
2), we put forward testable hypotheses on the structure of ﬁrms’ credit relationships. These
hypotheses are drawn from two sources. In part, they are drawn from the literature on the
role of concentrated creditors during private reorganizations (e.g., Levmore, 1982; Picker, 1992;
Penati and Zingales, 1997; Sheard, 1994) and especially from our companion theoretical analysis
in Minetti (2004) and Guiso and Minetti (2004) (henceforth MGM). A central tenet of this liter-
ature is that during private reorganizations concentrated creditors can misbehave to appropriate
resources and the structure of credit relationships can be used to mitigate this misbehavior. In
2part, our hypotheses are instead drawn from the literature on multiple borrowing.2 For con-
venience, we use the implications from MGM as a “benchmark” and then relate to them the
implications from the rest of the literature. The key feature in MGM is that the share of credit
granted by a lender measures the informational tightness of the credit relationship: the larger
the lender’s share, the more precise the information the lender acquires on the ﬁrm relative to
the other lenders. This feature is consistent with the implications of several theoretical studies
(e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997)3 and with recent evidence in Elsas (2005), who ﬁnds that
a bank is more likely to be the main bank of a ﬁrm when it holds a larger share in its ﬁnanc-
ing. The analysis in MGM shows that, by dierentiating its borrowing and hence the banks’
information, a ﬁrm can discipline its banks during a private reorganization, preventing them
from appropriating resources. However, dierentiated borrowing is costly because it can induce
the premature liquidation of good projects. This analysis generates implications for: (i) the
ﬁrm’s choice between borrowing from a single lender (undierentiated borrowing) and multiple,
dierentiated borrowing; (ii) the ﬁrm’s allocation of borrowing across its banks - the amount of
dierentiation - conditional on borrowing from multiple lenders. In the second part of the pa-
per, we test these predictions and the alternative/complementary hypotheses obtained from the
literature on multiple borrowing using the U.S. data in the National Survey of Small Business
Finance.4 We ﬁnd that ﬁrms with more valuable, more redeployable and more homogeneous
assets dierentiate their borrowing more sharply. We also ﬁnd some evidence that the degree
of borrowing dierentiation is inversely related to restructuring costs and positively related to
ﬁrms’ informational transparency. All in all, this evidence supports the idea that ﬁrms dieren-
tiate borrowing to mitigate banks’ misbehavior during reorganizations. At the same time, it is
consistent with incomplete contract theories of multiple borrowing.5 In particular, the structure
of credit relationships appears to be used to tighten creditors’ reﬁnancing policy and, hence,
to discourage entrepreneurs’ choice of ine!cient projects (soft budget constraint); it also ap-
pears to be used to prevent concentrated creditors from extracting rents during project lifetime
(hold-up).
This paper most closely relates to two strands of literature. The ﬁrst strand investigates the
role and (mis)behavior of banks and other concentrated creditors during ﬁrm reorganizations
(see, e.g., Penati and Zingales, 1997, and the aforementioned studies). The paper brings to the
data the implications of this strand of literature for the structure of multiple credit relationships,
as formalized by MGM. The second strand of literature studies the determinants of multiple
credit relationships.6 In Section 2, we elaborate on the link with theoretical studies. As for
the empirical studies, the existing papers generally assume that the creditors of a ﬁrm are
3symmetric and, hence, do not investigate the allocation of borrowing. For example, Ongena
and Smith (2000) relate the number of bank relationships to ﬁrm and country characteristics
using a dataset spanning twenty European countries while Benmelech, Garmaise and Moskowitz
(2005) investigate the impact of asset redeployability on the number of creditors using a measure
of the tightness of U.S. commercial zoning regulations to obtain variation in the degree of
redoployability. Finally, the paper shares some features with the literature on syndicated loans
(see, e.g., Suﬁ, 2005). Although it is insightful to carry out a comparison, because of the distinct
nature of syndicated loans, this literature has a dierent objective and focus.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the theoretical
background of our analysis: we ﬁrst explain our benchmark hypotheses on the structure of credit
relationships (2.1) and then integrate them with the alternative/complementary hypotheses in
the literature on multiple borrowing (2.2). In Section 3, we provide details on the data and the
empirical methodology. In Section 4, we present the main empirical results. In Section 5, we
perform robustness tests. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
2.1 The Benchmark Hypotheses
Our companion theoretical analysis in MGM closely follows the literature on the (mis)behavior
of concentrated creditors during private reorganizations (Levmore, 1982; Picker, 1992; Penati
and Zingales, 1997; Sheard, 1994) and formalizes the implications of this literature for the struc-
ture of multiple credit relationships (allocation of borrowing). The analysis can be explained as
follows. Consider a ﬁrm that can borrow from one or two banks and invest the borrowed funds
in a project. The project can be of good or bad quality, with the quality being initially unknown.
With some probability the project succeeds; alternatively, at an interim stage, the project en-
ters distress and can be terminated or reorganized. If the entrepreneur and the banks sustain
reorganization costs, with some probability the reorganization will succeed and the project will
yield output; alternatively, the reorganization will fail and the assets will be redeployed outside
the ﬁrm. The probability that the reorganization succeeds is higher for a good project than for
a bad one.
The key variable in the analysis is the precision of a bank’s information, which in turn is
tied to its share of ﬁnancing: the larger its share of ﬁnancing, the more precise the information
the bank obtains on the ﬁrm relative to the other bank. Information plays a dual role when
the project enters distress. First, an informed bank can more readily recognize the assets that
4are easily redeployable. Therefore, being better able to seize valuable assets, an informed bank
has greater ability to appropriate resources during the reorganization. Second, at the interim
stage an informed bank can more readily recognize whether the project is good and worth being
restructured or bad and worth being terminated.
The ﬁrm chooses initially between two “borrowing regimes”.7 I naﬁ r s tr e g i m e( “ n o n -
dierentiated borrowing”), it borrows from one bank; in a second regime (“dierentiated bor-
rowing”), it borrows dierent amounts from the two banks. In the “dierentiated borrowing”
regime, the ﬁrm also chooses the allocation of borrowing. In particular, for what just said, under
dierentiated borrowing the two banks have dierent information and their informational gap
is increasing in their ﬁnancing gap.
In MGM, borrowing from one bank and borrowing exactly equal shares of ﬁnancing from two
banks generate the same incentives for the banks. However, even tiny ﬁxed transaction costs for
establishing a credit relationship break the indierence and render symmetric borrowing from
two banks strictly dominated by borrowing from only one bank when undierentiated borrowing
is chosen. These transaction costs are a realistic feature of credit relationships and are frequently
assumed in the literature. Consistent with this, in the sample used for the empirical analysis
only a negligible number of ﬁrms borrowing from multiple lenders allocate their borrowing
exactly evenly across lenders. Hence, we will normally treat borrowing from multiple sources
and dierentiated borrowing as interchangeable.
The model in MGM shows that, when the agents cannot commit to reorganization decisions
and the asset allocation cannot be made contingent on the occurrence of distress, on the quality
of the project or on the asset redeployability, the banks can make an ine!cient reorganization
decision. In fact, they can elect to keep a bad project going for the sole purpose of seizing assets
during its reorganization.8 Borrowing asymmetrically from the two banks, the ﬁrm prevents
this misbehavior. In fact, the bank with the lowest share of ﬁnancing expects that, because of
its poor information, it will end up seizing assets with low redeployability and leaving highly
redeployable assets to the most informed bank. Therefore, this bank has no incentive to continue
a bad project. However, being poorly informed, this bank is also less able to recognize a good
project. Therefore, dierentiated borrowing can lead to the premature termination of a good
project.9
2.1.1 Empirical Implications
The analysis in MGM carries a number of empirical implications, which we summarize in Table
2 (see the seventh column for the allocation of borrowing and the second column for the choice
5between dierentiated and non-dierentiated borrowing).
Allocation of Borrowing. Given the decision of a ﬁrm to have dierentiated borrowing,
the degree of borrowing dierentiation depends on the following characteristics of the ﬁrm.
Asset Value. The degree of dierentiation is positively related to the value of the ﬁrm’s
assets. Intuitively, the greater the asset value, the greater the incentive of a bank to continue a
bad project solely in order to seize assets. Therefore, the greater the value of seizable assets, the
greater is the borrowing and informational dierentiation necessary to induce the least informed
bank to terminate a bad project.
Asset Redeployability. T h ed e g r e eo fd i erentiation is positively related to the asset average
redeployability. In fact, analogously to what observed for the asset value, the greater the asset
average redeployability, the greater the incentive of a bank to continue a bad project to seize
assets.
Asset Heterogeneity. T h ed e g r e eo fd i erentiation is inversely related to the asset hetero-
geneity (in redeployability). In fact, when the assets are highly heterogeneous, the bank with
the lowest share of ﬁnancing and information expects that it will claim assets with very low
redeployability. Therefore, this bank has the incentive to terminate a bad project even if it has
a small informational disadvantage relative to the other bank.
Restructuring Costs. T h ed e g r e eo fd i erentiation is inversely related to banks’ restructuring
cost. In fact, a high restructuring cost entails a low incentive for a bank to continue a bad project
to seize assets.
Informational Transparency. The degree of dierentiation is inversely related to the ﬁrm’s
informational transparency. In fact, if information on the quality of the project is publicly
available, a bank will be unable to disguise and continue a bad project to seize assets.
Dierentiated versus Non-Dierentiated Borrowing. When the borrowing dieren-
tiation necessary to deter the continuation of a bad project is large, the ﬁrm will face a too high
risk of premature liquidation of a good project and will opt for non-dierentiated borrowing
(borrowing from one bank). This implies, for example, that the value and redeployability of the
assets of the ﬁrm have a positive eect on the degree of borrowing dierentiation conditional on
choosing dierentiated borrowing, but a negative eect on the probability that the ﬁrm chooses
dierentiated borrowing -see Section 3.1 for more details. The analysis also predicts that the
choice between dierentiated and non-dierentiated borrowing depends on the quality of the
ﬁrm, though its eect can be either negative or positive. Intuitively, on the one hand when the
project is of good quality with high probability the cost of a premature termination of good
6projects associated with dierentiated borrowing will be severe. This tends to generate a neg-
ative relationship between the ﬁrm quality and the probability of dierentiated borrowing as a
good ﬁrm fears premature liquidation. On the other hand, when the project is of good quality
with high probability the banks will likely have assets to seize if a project is reorganized. This
fosters banks’ incentive to continue a bad project and renders dierentiated borrowing more
necessary, generating a positive relationship between the ﬁrm’s quality and the probability of
dierentiated borrowing. In addition, the model implies that the quality of the ﬁrm has no
eect on the allocation of borrowing (the degree of dierentiation); as we will see this provides a
natural theoretically-based exclusion restriction that we exploit to identify the empirical model.
2.2 Other Hypotheses
The predictions in MGM and in the literature on the (mis)behavior of concentrated creditors
during reorganizations can be complemented and contrasted with those of the incomplete con-
tract literature on multiple borrowing. The large majority of the theoretical studies reviewed
below focus on the choice between single and multiple borrowing but are silent on the allocation
of borrowing across multiple concentrated creditors.10 Only recently two strands of literature
(on the hold-up issue and on creditors’ monitoring) have been extended to explain the allocation
of borrowing. It is important to note that the analyses considered below have dierent ingredi-
ents. However, like MGM, they all share the broad view that, when contracts are incomplete,
creditors and entrepreneurs can misbehave and the structure of credit relationships helps to
mitigate this misbehavior.
Single versus Multiple Borrowing.
Soft Budget Constraint.
T h es o f tb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n tl i t e r a t u r ey i e l d sp r e d i c t i o n so nt h ec h o i c eb e t w e e ns i n g l ea n d
multiple borrowing. Bolton and Sharfstein (1996) show that multiple borrowing reduces the
incentive of solvent entrepreneurs to default strategically. In fact, multiple borrowing increases
the price that solvent entrepreneurs have to pay to repurchase the assets repossessed by their
creditors after the strategic default. However, multiple borrowing also increases the cost of
liquidity defaults by reducing the price that outside buyers are ready to pay for the assets of
the ﬁrm. In a related vein, Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) ﬁnd that borrowing from multiple
creditors hardens creditors’ budget constraint, deterring entrepreneurs from implementing long-
term unproﬁtable projects.
Bolton and Sharfstein (1996) oer predictions on the eect on the choice between single and
multiple borrowing of the quality and informational transparency of the ﬁrm and its asset value
7and redeployability (see Table 2, third column). In particular, they predict that the asset value
and redeployability negatively aect the probability of multiple borrowing: in fact, when the
assets have high value and liquidity the drop in liquidation returns associated with multiple
borrowing is sharp. They also predict that informational transparency negatively aects the
probability of multiple borrowing while the quality of the ﬁrm positively aects it. Intuitively,
for a high quality ﬁrm the cost of multiple borrowing is small because the ﬁrm is unlikely to
experience a liquidity default.
Hold-Up.
In the hold-up literature (Rajan, 1992; Hubert and Schafer, 2002), a bank with more infor-
mation than outside ﬁnanciers can exploit its informational monopoly over the ﬁrm and force
a renegotiation of the initial contract at an interim stage of the project. Precisely, the bank
can threaten to withhold the reﬁnancing of the project and extract rents, depressing the ﬁrm’s
investment eort ex ante. In Rajan (1992) and Hubert and Schafer (2002), borrowing from two
banks prevents the hold-up by inducing banks to compete in credit provision at the interim
stage. These studies yield two predictions (summarized in Table 2, fourth column). First, the
need for multiple borrowing is lower when the ﬁrm features higher informational transparency
and is therefore less exposed to the informational monopoly of its banks. Second, the quality
of the ﬁrm positively aects the probability of multiple borrowing. In fact, a high quality ﬁrm
suers from a severe rent extraction in case of hold-up (see also Elsas, 2005, for a discussion of
this point).
Monitoring.
Carletti (2004) and Carletti, Cerasi and Daltung (2005) focus on banks’ monitoring to ex-
plain the choice between single and multiple borrowing (see Table 2, ﬁfth column). In Carletti
(2004), banks’ monitoring mitigates an entrepreneur’s moral hazard by bringing down the pri-
vate beneﬁts that the entrepreneur derives from exerting low eort. However, monitoring is
costly and erodes the private beneﬁts that the entrepreneur can reap from her project. Carletti
(2004) predicts that a ﬁrm chooses multiple borrowing when monitoring costs are high and
its quality is high. In Carletti, Cerasi and Daltung (2005), a bank can default on its deposit
contracts and this dilutes its incentive to monitor. By borrowing from multiple banks, a ﬁrm
can foster banks’ monitoring by inducing better loan portfolio diversiﬁcation and lowering the
probability of default on deposits. However, multiple borrowing depresses monitoring by induc-
ing duplication of monitoring eort and free riding. Carletti, Cerasi and Daltung (2005) predict
that a ﬁrm chooses multiple borrowing when monitoring costs are high, its quality is low and
its size relative to the size of the banks is large.11
8Secrecy.
A fourth strand of literature focuses on the importance of secrecy for innovation (see Table 2,
sixth column). In Von Rheinbanen and Ruckes (2004) and Yosha (1995), a bank can disclose to
competitors information on the ﬁrm’s innovations. Since this risk is higher when the ﬁrm borrows
from multiple banks, Yosha (1995) predicts that innovative ﬁrms choose single borrowing. Von
Rheinbanen and Ruckes (2004), instead, endogenize the closeness of credit relationships and ﬁnd
that the impact of innovativeness on the number of banks is ambiguous. Von Rheinbanen and




Elsas, Heinemann, and Tyrell (2004) have recently extended the hold-up literature to ex-
plain the decision of a ﬁrm to borrow dierentially from multiple banks. As in Rajan (1992)
and Hubert and Schafer (2002), multiple borrowing reduces the risk of hold-up at an interim
stage. However, since multiple small banks make complementary ﬁnancing decisions and cannot
renegotiate the terms of loan contracts, multiple borrowing increases the risk that the banks
withdraw ﬁnancing at an interim stage. The ﬁrm can alleviate this risk of “coordination failure”
by borrowing predominantly from one bank. In fact, unlike many small banks, a large pivotal
bank can “forgive debt” at the interim stage: thus, the larger the share of ﬁnancing of this bank,
the better the ﬁrm will be able to face the credit withdrawal of the small banks. However, the
larger the share of ﬁnancing of the pivotal bank, the larger its bargaining power and the rents
it can extract. Elsas, Heinemann, and Tyrell (2004) predict that ﬁrms with high informational
transparency concentrate their borrowing more. Moreover, as we better discuss in Section 4
when we present the empirical results, they predict an ambiguous relationship between the asset
value and redeployability and the concentration of borrowing (see Table 2, eighth column).
Monitoring.
Suﬁ (2005) has recently revisited the literature on creditors’ monitoring to rationalize an
asymmetric borrowing structure in the context of syndicated loans. For syndicated loans one of
the multiple banks has an intrinsic advantage in monitoring the ﬁrm: in fact, the lead arranger
establishes a relationship with the ﬁrm and then turns to other banks to ﬁnance part of the loan.
As proved by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), in these scenarios the ﬁrm should concentrate its
borrowing in the hands of the lead bank to foster its monitoring and thereby raise the total level
of monitoring. The argument put forward by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) implies that ﬁrms
with low informational transparency should concentrate their borrowing more because they need
9more intense monitoring. Moreover, it implies that when monitoring costs are low ﬁrms need
to concentrate their borrowing less to induce su!cient monitoring (see Table 2, ninth column,
for these predictions). Note that, although Suﬁ’s study refers to syndicated loans granted to
large corporations, the logic applies as well to small businesses, which are more the object of
our empirical analysis.
3 Empirical Evidence
3.1 Data Description and Estimation Strategy
In what follows, we test the benchmark predictions and the complementary hypotheses discussed
in Section 2 on U.S. data. As a preliminary observation, note that, although some of the analyses
in Section 2 place emphasis on ﬁrm reorganizations, they do not imply that an empirical study
should be carried out on distressed ﬁrms. In fact, these analyses consider ﬁrms that evaluate in
expectation costs and beneﬁts of dierent debt structures in case of liquidation/reorganization.
Our main source of data is the National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF), which
is conducted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Small Business
Administration. We pool information from two survey waves, 1993 and 1998. The NSSBF is a
stratiﬁed random sample of for-proﬁt ﬁrms with fewer than 500 employees. The survey includes
data on ﬁnancial conditions, drawn from balance sheets and income statements, and detailed
information about relationships with ﬁnancial institutions. It also collects information on ﬁrm
demographics. We complement the information from the NSSBF with data on bank employees
and loans by census region from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), with data on
R&D and sales by industry from the Survey of Industrial Research and Development conducted
by the National Science Foundation/SRS, and with data from the Standard and Poor’s Full-
Coverage Compustat tapes.
The NSSBF survey gives data for 4,589 ﬁrms in 1993 and 3,431 in 1998, for a total of 8,020
ﬁrms.13 Firms in the pooled sample have on average 29.9 employees. The small size of the
ﬁrms in the survey appears suitable for our analysis. A crucial feature of most of the models
illustrated in Section 2 is that ﬁnanciers have heterogeneous information on the ﬁrm. This
feature is realistic if the ﬁrm is informationally opaque, and informational opacity is supposed
to be a characteristic of small ﬁrms because they are not monitored by rating agencies or by
the ﬁnancial press (Petersen and Rajan, 1994).14 Of the ﬁrms in the sample, 2,773 declare
they have no lending institutions, 2,694 have one and 2,553 have more than one. We will focus
on the subsample of 5,247 ﬁrms with at least one lending institution. Table 1 summarizes the
10structure of credit relationships, i.e. the number of creditors and the share of credit provided by
each ﬁnancial institution. The table suggests that ﬁrms that borrow from multiple institutions
substantially dierentiate their borrowing shares. The last three columns of Table 1 test formally
the null hypothesis that the shares of borrowing are the same across ﬁnancial institutions: as
the values of the I-test show, this hypothesis is always rejected by the data.
The benchmark hypotheses in MGM can be formalized as follows. Let G be an indicator
variable which takes on the value of one if the ﬁrm chooses dierentiated borrowing and zero
otherwise. Let also K denote the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index of the loans granted to the ﬁrm:
the closer K is to 1, the more borrowing is dierentiated across lenders. The solution in MGM











K = 1D + 2U + 3VU + 4F + 5W + x if G =1 = (2)
where S is the probability that the project is of good quality, D is the value of the assets of
the ﬁrm, U the asset average redeployability, VU the asset heterogeneity (in redeployability),
F the banks’ restructuring cost, W is an indicator of the ﬁrm’s informational transparency and
y and x are random errors. As we explained in Section 2.1, the analysis predicts a positive
sign on 4> 5> 1> 2> a negative sign on 2> 3> 6> 3> 4> 5> and an ambiguous sign on 1.
Condition (1) determines whether the ﬁrm chooses dierentiated borrowing or rather chooses
non-dierentiated borrowing and borrows from only one lender. Whether the ﬁrm has dieren-
tiated borrowing depends on all the variables that aect the degree of dierentiation and hence
on all the variables that aect K. Condition (2) determines instead the degree of borrowing
dierentiation conditional on having dierentiated borrowing.
The form of the solution in (1)-(2) suggests a two-step estimator, in the ﬁrst stage estimating
a probability model for whether the ﬁrm has dierentiated borrowing and in the second stage
estimating the degree of borrowing dierentiation conditional on having chosen dierentiated
borrowing while correcting for selection. To implement our test, we estimate a Heckman se-
lection model. In the ﬁrst stage, we estimate a probit for the probability of the ﬁrm having
dierentiated borrowing. In the second stage of the analysis, we estimate the degree of borrow-
ing dierentiation as a function of observables correcting for selection. As conditions (1)-(2) put
in evidence, the models in MGM present a natural exclusion restriction, which enables identiﬁ-
cation. While all the variables that aect the degree of borrowing dierentiation also aect the
decision to borrow from dierentiated sources, the probability S of the project being of good
quality aects the decision to rely on dierentiated borrowing, but not the degree of borrowing
11dierentiation. Thus, identiﬁcation can be obtained by inserting proxies for the ﬁrm quality in
the ﬁrst-stage probit and excluding them from the second-stage regression. Note also that this
exclusion restriction is not contradicted by the predictions of the models of multiple borrowing
reviewed in Section 2, which essentially focus on the role of quality in determining the number
of concentrated creditors but not the allocation of borrowing.
3.2 Measurement
Our dependent variable is the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index of loans, which is deﬁned as Km =
	l(Ordqlm@WrwdoOrdqvm)2 where Ordqlm stands for the value of the credit (possibly belonging
to dierent categories) extended by ﬁnancial institution l to ﬁrm m and WrwdoOrdqvm stands for
the total credit extended to the ﬁrm.15
I nT a b l e3 ,w es u m m a r i z et h em e a s u r e m e n to ft h ee x p l a n a t o r yv a r i a b l e s . A m o n gt h e s e
variables, we include the total value of the assets of the ﬁrm. We use dierent indicators to
proxy for the asset average redeployability. The redeployability of an asset depends both on the
liquidity of its secondary market and on the intrinsic nature of the asset. In order to capture
the liquidity of the secondary market, which we treat as our main measure of redeployability,
we use the degree of co-movement between the sales of the ﬁrm and the sales of other ﬁrms in
the same industry. As Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue, when the conditions of the ﬁrms in an
industry are positively correlated, the redeployability of the assets of the ﬁrms in that industry
is likely to be low. In fact, the best second-hand users of the assets of a ﬁrm are probably the
ﬁrms in its same industry, since they have the experience and know how to use these assets
eectively. If these second-hand users themselves have ﬁnancial problems when the ﬁrm is in
distress, they will buy, if at all, only at low prices; otherwise, the ﬁrm will have to sell to less
e!cient, out-of-industry users whose willingness to pay is low. To compute the co-movement of
sales, we use data from Compustat ﬁrms over the period 1950-2000 for a total of 251,782 ﬁrm-
year observations. We classify ﬁrms into sixty-four industries using a two-digit classiﬁcation
and then, for each industry, regress the standardized annual rate of growth of ﬁrms’ sales on a
full set of year dummies. If ﬁrms within an industry co-move signiﬁcantly, the year dummies
will explain a large part of sales variability. We thus retain the U2 of these regressions and use
it as a measure of co-movement of ﬁrms in the industry. Industries with high U2 will be high
co-movement industries. We then impute this measure to the ﬁrms in our sample using the
industry code.16
As a second proxy for the asset average redeployability, we use location (rural or urban)
setting a dummy equal to one if the ﬁrm has a rural location, zero otherwise. This proxy is
12aimed at capturing structural aspects that aect the liquidity of the secondary market. In
particular, ﬁrms that operate in urban areas presumably have easier access to e!cient resale
markets. Helsley and Strange (1991), for example, develop a model of a statistical agglomeration
economy in the capital market of an urban area. In their model, the resale value of pledged
assets is higher in cities because the density of possible second-hand uses is greater. Habib and
Johnsen (1999) also argue that redeployablity is likely to be higher in urban areas.17 Finally, as
a last proxy for redeployability that stems from asset characteristics, we use the share of illiquid,
either intangible or ﬁxed, assets. In fact, it is generally agreed that intangible and ﬁxed assets
are less easily redeployable than inventories or cash.
We now turn to variables capturing the asset heterogeneity.I n M G M , w h a t m a t t e r s i s
heterogeneity in redeployability. Dierences in redeployability can arise from heterogeneity in
the nature of the assets, stemming, for example, from functional diversity in the activities of
the ﬁrm. Unfortunately, we have no information on whether the ﬁrm produces one or multiple
products. Heterogeneity in redeployability can also stem from dierences in the location of the
assets, when the ﬁrm operates plants in dierent places. Geographical location and the liquidity
of local asset markets is likely to matter whenever assets are non-tradable, as in construction,
or where transportation costs are high. Since we lack details on the nature and location of the
assets used by the ﬁrm, we use various proxies to capture heterogeneity in redeployability. As
a gauge of functional diversity, we include the number of trade creditors normalized by the size
(sales) of the ﬁrm. For a given size of the ﬁrm, a higher number of suppliers may reﬂect the
presence of dierent lines of production and, therefore, the heterogenous nature of pledgeable,
productive assets. To capture geographical dispersion, we include a dummy for the number of
sites of the ﬁrm, set at one if the ﬁrm has only one site, i.e. is geographically homogeneous.18
We use two proxies of restructuring costs. One is the average length of the relationships
between the lending institutions and the ﬁrm. The experience that on average the lending in-
stitutions involved in a reorganization have accumulated with the ﬁrm is plausibly a key input
in the reorganization. The shorter the institutions’ experience with the ﬁrm, the greater their
eort, hence the larger the cost of reorganizing. Clearly, one can think that the average length
of the relationships may also capture other factors, such as the average degree of informational
transparency of the ﬁrm vis à vis its concentrated creditors. In this case, this proxy could
somewhat overlap with the measures of informational transparency discussed below. To account
for this, we also include the share of the ﬁrm owned by its principal owner as a second proxy
of restructuring costs. As argued by Hart (2001), when ownership is concentrated, stakehold-
ers supposedly have lower costs in coordinating actions, including direct costs for organizing
13meetings, transmitting information and so forth.
We follow the literature on relationship lending (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 2002) in measuring
the informational transparency of the ﬁrm. A ﬁrst proxy for informational transparency is the
size of the ﬁrm: small ﬁrms are thought to be less informationally transparent than bigger ones
because they are not monitored by rating agencies or by the ﬁnancial press. A second proxy is
the age of the ﬁrm: old ﬁrms are allegedly more informationally transparent than younger ones
because they have an established track-record. A third proxy is a dummy which takes on the
value of one if the ﬁrm has a business credit card, and zero otherwise. As Petersen and Rajan
(2002) argue, a business credit card is usually granted on the basis of a credit report, which
reﬂects the availability of accurate information on the ﬁrm in the credit market. A fourth proxy
consists of the ownership concentration of the ﬁrm, measured by the share of the ﬁrm owned by
the principal owner. As Petersen and Rajan (2002) argue, when owners are dispersed, the ﬁrm
needs a better informational structure to inform its various stakeholders. The last proxy relates
to the records used by the ﬁrm to answer the income statement and balance sheet questions in
the survey. We construct a dummy which takes on the value of one if the ﬁrm declares that it
used written records to answer these questions, and zero otherwise.19 In fact, the availability of
written records signals a well organized information structure.
We also follow Petersen and Rajan (2002) in the measurement of monitoring costs.I nt h e i r
analysis, monitoring costs are proxied by the productivity of local bank employees. The more
advanced the monitoring technology, the higher this productivity and the lower the cost that
banks face in monitoring ﬁrms. For both years of the survey, we thus measure monitoring costs
with the number of bank employees in the census region where the ﬁrm is located standardized
by the total amount of loans in the region. The data were obtained from the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
As discussed in Section 2.2, the literature on secrecy and innovation attributes to ﬁrms’
innovativeness a role in shaping ﬁrms’ debt structure. The survey does not report information
on the degree of ﬁrm innovativeness. We thus follow the approach in Guiso (1998) and construct
a sector-level indicator of innovativeness. Precisely, we compute the amount of private R&D
expenditures in the two-digit sector normalized by the total volume of sales in the sector in
1998, the year of the second wave of the NSSBF.20 In this case, the data were obtained from
the National Science Foundation/SRS.
Finally, we aim at measuring ﬁrm quality. The survey asks the ﬁrm about its credit history,
and we use this information to proxy for ﬁrm quality (see also Section 5.3 for further discussion).
More speciﬁcally, the NSSBF asks ﬁrms several questions: Within the past seven years, has the
14ﬁrm or its principal owner declared bankruptcy? we set a dummy variable for bankruptcy equal
to one if the ﬁrm answers “yes”. Within the past three years, on how many dierent personal
obligations has the principal owner been 60 or more days delinquent? possible answers are:
none, one, two, three or more. We set the variable “delinquent on personal obligations” equal
to zero if it has never been delinquent, to one, two and three if it has been delinquent once,
twice or three or more times. The third proxy for ﬁrm quality is obtained from the question:
Within the past three years, on how many dierent business obligations has the ﬁrm been 60
or more days delinquent? Please include trade credit, or credit from suppliers. Possible answers
are: none, one, two, three or more. We set the variable “delinquent on business obligations”
equal to zero if it has never been delinquent, to one, two or three if it has been delinquent once,
twice, three or more times. Hence, ﬁrm quality is decreasing with all our three indicators.
Table 4 reports summary statistics for the variables used. Panel A refers to all the ﬁrms in
the pooled NSSBF sample; Panel B refers to the sample of ﬁrms with at least one lender on
which we run our estimates. There appear to be three main dierences between the two groups.
Firms with at least one lender are larger (an average of about 40 employees versus 30 for the
whole sample). Firms that borrow from ﬁnancial institutions also have fewer trade creditors on
average, which is reasonable as they exploit other sources of funding. Finally, these ﬁrms exhibit
less concentrated ownership. This could be due to their larger size and the reluctance of small
businessmen to share ownership and control.
4 Empirical Results
Table 5 displays the results of the estimates. We report three dierent sets of regressions: Panels
A and B focus on the speciﬁcation implied by the hypotheses in MGM; Panel C also includes
variables predicted by the related incomplete contract theories on multiple borrowing reviewed
in Section 2 but not by MGM.
A well known feature of the Herﬁndahl index is that it varies both because the concentration
of borrowing can vary and because the number of multiple creditors can dier across ﬁrms.
Hence, if we rely on the whole sample, any eect of the explanatory variables on the Herﬁndahl
index may reﬂect their eect on the number of lenders rather than on the asymmetry in bor-
rowing from various lenders. To avoid this possibility, we restrict the sample to the ﬁrms that
borrow from only two lenders, when they have more than one relation. This way, any variation
in concentration of borrowing that is explained by our regressors reﬂects only the eect of these
variables on the degree of dierentiation in ﬁrms’ borrowing patterns. An alternative, which we
15pursue later, is to insert in the regressions variables that have a strong explanatory power on the
number of relations. As shown by Detragiache, Garella and Guiso (2000), ﬁrm size, whatever its
interpretation, is the single most important determinant of the number of bank relations; thus,
controlling for size in our second stage regression is enough to account for the eect of variation
in the number of relations on the Herﬁndahl index, as we will show.
From a theoretical standpoint, focussing on the sample of ﬁrms that borrow from two lenders
is consistent with the analysis in MGM and close in spirit to other studies. For example, Bolton
and Sharfstein (1996) consider a basic scenario with one or two creditors; more in general,
as stressed by Ongena and Smith (2000), the extant incomplete contract theories of multiple
borrowing are “one-to-few” creditor theories. On the basis of the above considerations, we ﬁrst
run our regressions on the sub-sample of ﬁrms with up to two lenders and disregard all ﬁrms
that borrow from three or more sources (1,161 observations). We also drop the very small ﬁrms
(ﬁve or less employees, 1,798 observations) as their borrowing pattern may be dictated by the
presence of ﬁxed borrowing costs;21 in the next section we check the robustness of our results to
these exclusions. After these exclusions and the loss of some observations due to missing values
in the explanatory variables, the ﬁnal sample comprises 2,302 ﬁrms of which 913 borrowed from
multiple lenders and 1,389 had only one lender.
Consider the ﬁrst-stage regression, whose estimate is shown in the ﬁrst column of each panel.
As we explained in Section 3, we include three indicators of the ﬁrm’s credit history (a dummy for
going bankrupt plus indicators of delinquency on business or personal obligations) in the probit
but not in the second-stage regression. Firms with a past personal or business delinquency are
more likely to borrow from multiple lenders and dierentiate borrowing among their lenders.
Both these indicators of ﬁrm quality are generally statistically signiﬁcant, reassuring us about
the power of the instruments. Using the estimates in Panel A, we ﬁnd that, compared with ﬁrms
that have never been delinquent on business obligations, those that have been delinquent three
or more times are 6.6 percentage points more likely to borrow from multiple lenders, and those
that have been delinquent three or more times on personal obligations 10.4 percentage points
more likely (about 25 percent of the sample mean). By contrary, the indicator for bankruptcy
over the past seven years has no eect on the probability of multiple borrowing. Since one
exclusion restriction is su!cient to achieve identiﬁcation, we can also test the validity of our
instruments by inserting the three indicators of ﬁrm quality one at a time in the second-stage
regression. If the exclusion restrictions are valid, they should be statistically insigniﬁcant. And
in fact, inserting in turn the indicators of personal delinquency, of business delinquency and of
bankruptcy, we ﬁnd that none is statistically signiﬁcant.
16The negative eect of ﬁrm quality on the probability of choosing dierentiated borrowing is
consistent with the predictions in MGM as long as ﬁrms’ fear of premature liquidation outweighs
that of seeing their assets seized during a reorganization. By contrary, this negative eect is in
general at odds with the implications of the other strands of the incomplete contract literature,
which often predicts that high quality ﬁrms prefer multiple borrowing. For example, in the hold-
up literature (see, e.g., Rajan, 1992) high quality ﬁrms choose multiple borrowing because they
are severely damaged by banks’ hold-up and the associated rent extraction. Carletti, Cerasi,
and Daltung (2004) constitute a notable exception. In fact, they predict that high quality ﬁrms
resort to single borrowing because, thanks to their good prospects, they can induce their unique
lender to monitor intensively and thereby they can commit to e!cient investment plans.
The probability of dierentiated funding is positively correlated with the value of assets. As
we see in Table 2, this contradicts the predictions in MGM, because in that analysis asset value
increases the optimal degree of dierentiation conditional on choosing dierentiated borrowing,
but should have a negative eect on the probability of dierentiated borrowing. This result also
conﬂicts with the predictions obtained by the soft budget constraint literature. In Bolton and
Sharfstein (1996), for example, ﬁrms with little assets realize low liquidation returns regardless
of the number of creditors and, hence, are more willing to experience the drop in liquidation
returns that multiple borrowing entails. One reasonable explanation for the positive sign on
the asset value is that it reﬂects a positive correlation between ﬁrm size and the probability of
multiple borrowing, for example due to the fact that large ﬁrms need larger loans and a wider
range of services than small ﬁrms. To check this possibility further, we add the ﬁrm workforce
(in logs) as a proxy for size. Indeed, the coe!cient on assets decreases considerably and loses
precision although it remains positive and statistically signiﬁcant.22
Turning to the ﬁrm’s co-movement - our main proxy for ease of asset redeployment - we ﬁnd
that it has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant (at the 9 percent level) eect on the probability
of dierentiated borrowing. Raising co-movement from the 10wk to the 90wk percentile of the
distribution increases the probability of multiple dierentiated borrowing by 5 percentage points,
about 12.5 percent of the sample mean. Both the dummy variable for the rural/urban location
and the share of illiquid assets have a positive sign, but neither is statistically signiﬁcant. These
results for the proxies of asset redeployability match the predictions obtained by MGM and are
also consistent with the predictions of the soft budget constraint literature (e.g., Bolton and
Sharfstein, 1996) - see Table 2. This suggests that multiple borrowing constitutes a device to
discipline banks and entrepreneurs. Of the two proxies for asset heterogeneity, the number of
trade creditors of the ﬁrm is never statistically signiﬁcant either in the probit or in the intensity
17regressions and has thus been dropped in the ﬁnal regressions; the indicator for single plant has
a negative sign and is statistically signiﬁcant at the 8 percent level. This ﬁnding is consistent
with the prediction in MGM that ﬁrms with geographically diversiﬁed assets resort to multiple
borrowing more.
Turning next to the variables speciﬁcally aimed at capturing the ﬁrm’s informational trans-
parency, we ﬁnd that the credit card indicator has a negative sign (signiﬁcant in one speciﬁcation)
while the age of the ﬁrm and the indicator for whether the ﬁrm has written records are not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant (see Panels B and C). Although non-conclusive, the result for the credit
card indicator is consistent with the idea that more informationally transparent ﬁrms need to
resort less to multiple dierentiated borrowing. This is in line with our benchmark predictions
and with those of other incomplete contract theories, such as the soft budget constraint and
the hold-up theory, suggesting that the availability of public information mitigates banks’ and
entrepreneurs’ misbehavior. The result for the variable “ownership concentration” deserves a
more careful inspection. As we argued in Section 3, this variable can be interpreted either as a
proxy of restructuring costs or as a proxy of informational transparency. Under our benchmark
hypotheses, with both types of interpretation ownership concentration is predicted to have a
positive eect on the probability of borrowing from multiple creditors, which is indeed what we
ﬁnd in the data. The other variable aimed at measuring restructuring costs behaves as predicted
by our benchmark hypotheses. In fact, the probability of multiple borrowing is aected nega-
tively by the average duration of the relationships between the ﬁrm and its lenders: using the
estimates in Panel A, a one standard deviation increase in the average length of the relations
lowers the probability of dierentiated borrowing by 7.8 percentage points. Finally, the proxies
for monitoring costs and ﬁrm innovativeness are not statistically signiﬁcant.
The estimates of the degree of borrowing dierentiation across lenders are reported in the
second column of each panel. The degree of dierentiation increases with the asset value, even
after controlling for ﬁrm size, as measured by the log number of employees; the coe!cient is
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The result for the value of assets is remarkable, because it means that
a ﬁrm with more assets that borrows from two institutions will tend to allocate borrowing in a
more dierentiated way (borrowing, say 80 percent from the ﬁrst and 20 from the second) than
a ﬁrm with less assets, which will tend to divide its borrowing more evenly. Using the estimates
in Panel A, increasing assets by one standard deviation raises the degree of dierentiation by
4.3 percentage points - about 10 percent of the sample mean. This result is corroborated by the
ﬁndings for the proxies of asset liquidity. Co-movement has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant
eect on the degree of borrowing dierentiation; economically, increasing co-movement from the
1810wk to the 90wk percentile lowers the Herﬁndahl on loans by 3.3 percentage points (8.25 percent
of the sample mean). The dummies for rural location and the share of illiquid assets have a
negative sign and are signiﬁcant at the 4.6% and at the 5.4% level respectively. These results
for the asset value and liquidity match the predictions in MGM. In fact, in that analysis banks
have a strong incentive to make ine!cient choices to appropriate valuable and liquid assets:
therefore, ﬁrms with more valuable and liquid assets need to dierentiate their borrowing more
in order to prevent this misbehavior. For the sake of comparison, observe that, as displayed in
Table 2 (eighth column), the analysis in Elsas, Heinemann, and Tyrell (2004) yields ambiguous
predictions for the eect of the asset value and liquidity on borrowing concentration. In fact,
two opposite forces are at work in their analysis. On the one hand, when the assets that the
lenders can repossess are very valuable and liquid, the additional surplus that the lenders can
extract in case of hold-up is small. This mitigates the hold-up cost associated with concentrated
borrowing and, hence, tends to raise borrowing concentration. On the other hand, when the
assets are very valuable and liquid, the probability that the banks with small stakes in the ﬁrm
rush to withdraw ﬁnancing at an interim stage is low. This renders concentrated borrowing less
necessary and, hence, tends to reduce borrowing concentration.
Turning to the geographical indicator for asset heterogeneity (one site), we ﬁnd that it has
a positive and signiﬁcant eect on borrowing dierentiation, as predicted by MGM. This may
indeed indicate that ﬁrms with more geographically homogeneous assets need to dierentiate
their borrowing more to prevent banks’ misbehavior. Among the remaining variables, we ﬁnd
that the availability of written records tends to induce higher borrowing concentration: this
is consistent with the positive eect that informational transparency has on concentration in
Elsas, Heinemann, and Tyrell (2004), for example. Finally, the other proxies for informational
transparency and the proxies for monitoring costs and innovativeness are estimated with a high
standard error.
To sum up, the results of the estimates appear to support the hypotheses on the structure
of multiple credit relationships obtained in MGM and more broadly in the literature on the
(mis)behavior of concentrated creditors during reorganizations. This conclusion is reinforced
by the observation that the signs of the coe!cients in the second-stage and in the ﬁrst-stage
regressions (with the exception of the asset value) tend to be opposite, as MGM imply. At
the same time, the results also support hypotheses drawn from incomplete contract theories
of multiple borrowing: in particular, we ﬁnd evidence that the hold-up and the soft budget
constraint issues have an important role in shaping the structure of credit relationships.
195 Robustness Tests
In this section, we perform robustness checks. First, we examine issues of sample selection;
second, we account for the possibility that dierent types of loans have dierent informational
content; third, we consider alternative proxies for the allocation of borrowing and for ﬁrm quality.
5.1 Sample Selection
The results in Table 5 are based on a selected sample that excludes ﬁrms borrowing from
more than two sources; while this is intentionally done to identify the eect of the explanatory
variables on borrowing concentration, since ﬁrms choose the number of lenders, our estimates
may be aected by selection bias. To account for this, in Table 6, Panel A, we re-estimate our
regressions by including ﬁrms that borrow from more than two lenders, while retaining only
those with more than ﬁve employees. We control for variation in the Herﬁndahl index induced
by the number of relations by controlling for the size of the ﬁrm, measured by the number of
employees. If this is an eective control, the coe!cients of the other explanatory variables should
not be very dierent from those in Table 5. The sample size increases to 2,586 ﬁrms, but the size
and signiﬁcance of the parameters estimated are essentially unchanged. The result we obtain
for the asset value appears to further corroborate the idea that we are properly controlling for
variation in the Herﬁndahl index induced by the number of relations. If the asset value were
picking some of the eect that size has on concentration via the number of lenders, it would have
a negative sign (larger ﬁrms, larger asset value, more lenders, lower concentration). By contrary,
consistent with our benchmark hypotheses, we ﬁnd that asset value increases the concentration
of borrowing and its coe!cient is not die r e n tf r o mt h a ti nT a b l e5 . I nP a n e lB ,w ee x p a n d
the sample to include ﬁrms with at least two employees, while retaining only those that borrow
from just two lenders. Again, results are essentially unchanged; the only coe!cient that becomes
lower and loses signiﬁcance is that of the degree of co-movement in the probit equation; the other
parameters are basically unaected. Finally, in Panel C we carry out the estimates on the whole
sample; results are robust to this extension too, conﬁrming that they are not driven by sample
selection.
5.2 The Informational Content of Loans
It is sometimes argued that dierent types of loans can convey dierent amounts of information
to a creditor. For example, in the parlance of Wall Street, credit lines are thought to be more
“relationship-driven” than other forms of loans (Berger and Udell, 1995). According to Berger
20and Udell (1995), mortgages, equipment loans, motor vehicle loans are often one-time loans or
loans for nonrecurring credit needs and this dilutes their informational content. By contrary,
the informational content associated with the long term commitment of credit lines is likely to
be more substantial. Thus, as a robustness check for our results, we compute our measure of
loan concentration (the Herﬁndahl) by assigning a higher weight to credit lines. In Table 7,
we display the results obtained with two dierent weighting schemes: in Panel A, we assign a
weight of two to credit lines and a weight of one to the remaining categories of loans; in Panel
B, we take a starker approach and assign a weight of one to credit lines and a weight of zero to
the remaining categories of loans. The results of the estimates are virtually identical to those
already discussed. Since the choice of the “informational weights” is arbitrary, we experimented
with other weighting schemes, obtaining similar results.
5.3 Alternative Proxy Variables
Borrowing Dierentiation. The reader could wonder whether our results are robust to
using alternative measures of borrowing dierentiation, such as the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index
of the duration of credit relationships. The latter measure is consistent with the analysis in
MGM, although it is a poor ﬁt for the analysis in Elsas, Heinemann, and Tyrell (2004), for
example, where the share of loans is interpreted literally rather than as a proxy for information.
We thus reestimated our regressions using the Herﬁndahl of the duration of credit relationships.
The results (not reported for brevity) generally conﬁrm our ﬁndings. For example, borrowing
dierentiation is negatively aected by ﬁrms’ co-movement, while the probability of multiple
dierentiated borrowing is negatively related to ﬁrm quality, and to the asset liquidity (inverse
of co-movement) and homogeneity (one site), though the statistical signiﬁcance of the parameters
is lower than in the regressions with the Herﬁndahl of loans. Lack of precision in the estimates
can be explained by recent results of the literature on relationship lending. In fact, Elsas (2005)
ﬁnds that the length of a credit relationship is a much poorer indicator of the tightness of the
relationship than the share of credit granted by the ﬁnancier.
Firm Quality. In the empirical analysis we have proxied the quality of the ﬁrm with
measures of its probability of default. The reader could wonder whether this approach is too
restrictive and we have neglected alternative measures of the quality of the ﬁrm such as its
proﬁtability. To check the robustness of the results, we thus reestimated our regressions adding
the proﬁts of the ﬁrm normalized by its sales as an additional control variable. Since the exclusion
restriction drawn from MGM speciﬁcally refers to ﬁrm quality as proﬁtability of default, we
21experimented with proﬁtability in both stages of the estimation and then only in the ﬁrst stage.
Regardless of the approach followed, proﬁtability turned out to be statistically insigniﬁcant in
virtually all the estimations. Furthermore, the inclusion of proﬁtability left the results virtually
unaected.23
6C o n c l u s i o n
We have examined how a ﬁrm allocates its borrowing across multiple concentrated creditors.
In formulating our benchmark hypotheses, we have been inspired by growing evidence on the
misbehavior of concentrated creditors during private reorganizations. This misbehavior is far
from being a remote problem. In fact, large creditors appear to behave opportunistically not
only during reorganizations but also before the distress of a ﬁrm becomes publicly known, when
they can detect failure more quickly and grab the available assets ﬁrst. For example, analyzing
Belgian ﬁrms, Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) ﬁnd that the share of collateral that a bank can
seize increases with the tightness of the relationship between the ﬁrm and the bank, as measured
by the scope of services provided by the latter.
We have tested our benchmark hypotheses on the structure of credit relationships and the
complementary hypotheses in the incomplete contract literature on multiple borrowing using
data from a sample of small U.S. ﬁrms. We have found that ﬁrms with more valuable and more
redeployable assets dierentiate their borrowing more sharply. We have also found that ﬁrms
with assets more heterogeneous in their redeployability choose to have less dierentiated links
with their creditors. Finally, we have found some evidence that the degree of borrowing dier-
entiation is inversely related to restructuring costs and positively related to ﬁrms’ informational
transparency. All in all, this evidence appears to conﬁrm our hypotheses.
We believe that this analysis represents a step in a potentially fruitful line of research. As
stressed by Bolton and Sharfstein (1996), although debt is far more important than equity as a
source of ﬁnancing, in the past the corporate ﬁnance literature devoted much more attention to
explaining ﬁrms’ debt to equity ratio than the structure of ﬁrms’ debt. Indeed, since Bolton and
Sharfstein (1996), some scholars have carried out analyses on ﬁrms’ choice between dispersed
and concentrated debt. In this paper, we have found that treating concentrated debt itself as
a monolithic entity is unjustiﬁed and that the distribution of borrowing across concentrated
creditors may provide rich insights.
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25Notes 1Throughout the analysis, we use the term “bank” with a broad meaning, as standing for any concentrated
lender or ﬁnancial institution.
2Analyzing the restructuring of the Italian Ferruzzi Group (19.9 billion dollars of total indebtedness), Penati
and Zingales (1997) ﬁnd that the bank restructuring committee gained a net Lit. 1,952 billion ($1.3 billion)
from the (reorganization) plan with respect to an equally feasible break-up alternative and argue that, during
private reorganizations, “...the desire to increase their payo leads the “controlling” creditors to choices that are
ine!cient (p. 29)”. Analyzing lenders’ practice in the United States, Picker (1992, p. 657) writes “Creditors
fear their fellow creditors. When the going gets tough, the tough creditor gets going: aggressive creditors seek
payment of their claims in full from the failing debtor with the hope of avoiding the pro rata payment regime that
would otherwise apply in bankruptcy”. Sheard (1994) argues that this type of opportunistic behavior extends to
Japanese main banks that frequently intervene in the reorganization of distressed ﬁrms but then force the ﬁrms
into bankruptcy after securing their own claims.
3Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) develop a model where the larger the amount of credit a lender grants to a ﬁrm,
the higher its incentive to acquire information on the ﬁrm.
4In fact, a substantial amount of the information a lender acquires about a ﬁrm comes through its operations
with the ﬁrm. Observing how a credit line evolves, whether a ceiling is exceeded and how often, whether install-
ments on loans are regularly paid etc., conveys excellent information on the ﬁnancial and economic condition of
a ﬁrm. This is also consistent: i) with banks’ practice of computing “internal scores”, that is scores based on
information derived solely from how the credit relation evolves; ii) with the existence of Credit Registers, i.e.
devices through which banks share some of the information they obtain from a relationship with a ﬁrm. Credit
Registers make sense only if relations are continuously started over (e.g., because of high geographical mobility,
as shown by Pagano and Jappelli, 1993) or because borrowers engage in multiple relationships so that each lender
has partial information on its customers. However, since information is only partially shared, lenders will continue
to have dierent information even when a Credit Register is available.
5For a detailed analysis of the costs and beneﬁts of credit relationships when contracts are incomplete, see,
e.g., chapter 10 in Allen and Gale (2000).
6The paper also shares some features with the empirical analyses on corporate reorganizations (see, e.g., Gilson,
John and Lang, 1990, and Weiss, 1990).
7The analysis is robust to specifying that the ﬁrm establishes credit relationships sequentially rather than
simultaneously. In fact, the bargaining power of a bank when contracting upon the ﬁrm’s assets is related only
to its share of ﬁnancing, regardless of when the credit relationship starts.
8In this aspect, the model shares some features with the analysis of Manove, Padilla, and Pagano (2001)
where the presence of su!cient collateral can discourage a bank from screening a project and, hence, induce the
continuation of bad projects.
9In Minetti (2004) and Guiso and Minetti (2004), a bank’s bargaining power in asset seizure and its reorgani-
zation cost are proportional to its share of ﬁnancing. This implies that the ﬁrm derives no beneﬁt from having
multiple credit relationships in terms of competition among banks at an interim stage of the project (as instead
it happens in the hold-up literature -see Rajan (1992) and Section 2.2 in this paper for more).
10Focussing on dispersed debt, Bris and Welch (2005) develop a model in which the larger the number of
creditors the higher creditors’ incentive to free ride on each other. Bris and Welch (2005) focus on problems of
team free-riding among dispersed creditors, i.e. “very small creditors that may not ﬁnd it worthwhile to register”
(p. 21). This paper focuses instead on concentrated creditors, such as banks.
2611For an analysis of lenders’ monitoring in a more abstract setting, see Khalil, Martimort, and Parigi (2004).
12Two other studies are worth mentioning. Fluet and Garella (2005) study a model with multiple lenders
with dierent information and focus on the possibly imperfect aggregation of information. In their model, a
ﬁrm borrows from multiple lenders and at the liquidation/continuation stage a non-informed lender can choose
to continue only because it knows that its mistake can be corrected by a better informed lender. Detragiaghe,
Garella and Guiso (2000) develop a model where a ﬁrm may borrow from multiple banks to insure itself against
negative liquidity shocks hitting its main bank (and the consequent contraction of credit). The only determinant
of the number of banks that is not already accounted for in other theories is the degree of fragility of the main
bank. However, in order to test its impact on the number of creditors, one would need matched bank-ﬁrm data,
which we lack.
13We dropped a few observations with exceedingly high (A2.84e07 current dollars) and exceedingly low assets
(?270 current dollars). These ﬁrms are clear outliers.
14Another possible reason for which small ﬁrms better ﬁt our analysis is that their stakeholders could be
relatively unsophisticated and, hence, unable to contrast the misconduct of concentrated creditors. For example,
the trade creditors of small ﬁrms are often themselves small ﬁrms.
15Categories of loans include: credit lines, leases, mortgages, motor vehicle loans, equipment loans, and other
loans.
16The number of observations on which the co-movement measure is based varies with industry; the mean is
7,292, the lowest 402. Note also that the NSSBF requests each ﬁrm to provide a unique SIC code to classify the
ﬁrm’s activities. Being very small businesses, it is unlikely that these ﬁrms operate in more than one industry at
least when a two-digit classiﬁcation is used, as we do.
17MGM predict that ﬁrms located in rural areas have more incentives to borrow from more than one bank.
Interestingly, this prediction is the opposite of what one would derive from the argument that in rural areas the
oer of ﬁnancial services is more limited than in cities.
18If we focus on the ﬁrst-stage regression, MGM predict that ﬁrms with more than one site borrow from
more than one bank. In principle, one could argue that this is because a ﬁrm wants to minimize the distance
between plants and creditors. In particular, a ﬁrm with multiple plants could have an advantage in borrowing
from multiple creditors, each close to a plant and with particular expertise in assessing production in that plant.
However, Petersen and Rajan (2002) ﬁnd that, at least for U.S. ﬁrms, thanks to computers and communication
equipment, hard information about a ﬁrm is now also available at a distance, and distance itself has become a far
less important factor than in the past.
19Written records include tax records and ﬁnancial statements.
20We rely only on the 1998 data because data for 1993 - which could match the ﬁrst wave of the NSSBF - had
several missing observations. However, for the industries where the information is available for both years we
found a positive and high correlation coe!cient between the indicator in the two years, suggesting a fairly stable
pattern of R&D intensity across industries.
21Moreover, the ﬁnancing of some assets could exhibit some indivisibility and this could bias the results towards
concentrated funding. If present, these indivisibilities are likely to be relatively more important for ﬁrms with a
small volume of activity and to be negligible for bigger ﬁrms. This suggests dropping very small ﬁrms.
22For a more thorough discussion on the correlation between ﬁrm size and number of lenders, see Detragiache,
Garella, and Guiso (2000). The positive correlation between the probability of dierentiated funding and asset
value could also stem from ﬁnancial imperfections and supply side eects. In particular, if some minimum collateral
27is required, a ﬁrm with low asset value could be unable to borrow from more than one bank.
23Two further issues are worth discussion. The ﬁrst is the persistence of the debt structure. The cross-sectional
nature of the NSSBF data does not allow us to investigate (exploit) possible time variation in the structure of
credit relationships. However, to have a feeling about this, we considered data from the “VIII Indagine sulle
Imprese Manufatturiere”, a survey of small and medium sized manufacturing ﬁrms conducted by the Italian
banking group Capitalia in 2001. This survey reveals that the bank with the largest share of ﬁnancing tends
to be the same for many years (on average 17). This suggests high stability in the shares of borrowing across
lenders, thus implying that most variation is likely to be cross sectional. The second issue is the role of collateral.
The analysis in MGM especially applies to free assets, that is assets that do not secure any loan in particular.
The NSSBF data do not report the value of collateral so that we cannot measure the percentage of free assets.
However, the mean share of collateralized loans is below 55%. This suggests that many creditors are not secured
by collateral and may have an incentive to try and seize free assets. Moreover, for secured lenders the face value
of debt may well exceed the collateral value so that these lenders may also have the incentive to seize free assets.
Finally, even making the implausible assumption that for all the collateralized loans the value of collateral equals
the face value of debt, debt is only a fraction of the assets of a ﬁrm implying that a signiﬁcant portion of a ﬁrm’s
assets do not secure any loan in particular.
28Table 1: Structure of Credit Relationships
The table summarizes the structure of lending relations for the U.S. ﬁrms in the pooled 1993 and 1998
waves of the National Survey of Small Business Finance conducted by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System and the Small Business Administration. The second column reports the share of
ﬁrms in the sample that have n (=0, 1, 2, 3, A3) lenders. Columns 3-6 report the share of loans granted
by each lender ranked from highest to lowest. Columns 7-9 report the F-values for a test of the equality
between the shares of loans granted by two dierent lenders (ﬁrst and second in column 7, ﬁrst and third






from {wk lender I-test for equal borrowing shares
1st 2nd 3rd other 1st vs 2nd 1st vs 3rd 2nd vs 3rd
No lenders 0.334
One 0.339 1.00
Two 0.180 0.765 0.235 478.44
Three 0.080 0.651 0.181 0.168 701.75 1,352.05 135.92
Four or more 0.067 0.538 0.174 0.065 0.229 849.30 1,212.28 193.50
29Table 2: Expected Signs of the Eect of the Explanatory Variables
For the theories in Section 2 of the paper, the table summarizes the expected eects of the explanatory
v a r i a b l e su s e di ne s t i m a t i o no nt h ed e c i s i o nt or e l yo nd i erentiated borrowing (i.e. borrow from multiple
lenders, the extensive margin) and on the extent of dierentiation conditional on dierentiating (the
intensive margin). In the probability of dierentiation the dependent variable is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the ﬁrm has more than one lender. In the degree of dierentiation the dependent variable
is the degree of concentration of the loans obtained from the ﬁrm’s multiple lenders, as measured by the
Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index. “MGM” refers to the analysis in Minetti (2004) and Guiso and Minetti
(2004); “SBC” refers to the soft budget constraint literature, especially Bolton and Sharfstein (1996);
“Hold-up” refers to the literature on the hold-up issue, especially Rajan (1992) and Hubert and Shafer
(2002) for the probability of dierentiated borrowing and Elsas, Heinemann, and Tyrell (2004) for the
degree of dierentiation; “Monitor.” refers to the literature on banks’ monitoring, especially Carletti
(2004) and Carletti, Cerasi and Daltung (2005) for the probability of dierentiation and Holmstrom and
Tirole (1997) for its degree; “Secrecy” refers to the literature on secrecy and innovation, especially Von
Rheinbanen and Ruckes (2004) and Yosha (1995).
Eect on
Variable Probability of Dierentiation Degree of Borrowing
Dierentiation
MGM SBC Hold-up Monitor. Secrecy MGM Hold-up Monitor.
Firm Quality ?+ + ? +
Asset Value  +?
Asset Liquidity  +?
Asset Heterog. + 
Transparency    + 
Monitor. Costs + +
Restruct. Costs + 
Innovativeness 
Table 3: Measurement of the Explanatory Variables
The table lists the proxies used in the empirical analysis to measure the variables in Table 2.
Variable Proxies
Firm Quality Business and Personal Delinquency, Bankruptcy
Asset Value Asset Value
Asset Liquidity Comovement, Rural Location, Share Illiquid Assets
Asset Heterogeneity One Site Dummy, Number of Suppliers
Information Transparency Size, Age, Credit Card, Records
Monitoring Costs Region (Bank Employees)/Loans
Restructuring Costs Average Length of Relations, Ownership Concentration
Firm Innovativeness Sector R&D/Sales
30Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
The table reports summary statistics for the variables used in estimation. Panel A refers to the whole
sample; Panel B to the sample of ﬁrms with at least one lender. In each panel, the second column reports
the mean of the variables while columns three to ﬁve report the quartiles of the distribution. Loans
concentration is measured by the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index. Assets and sales are in current dollars.
Rural location, one site, bankruptcy, records, and credit card are dummies taking the value of one if the
ﬁrm has the speciﬁed characteristic. The length of relations is expressed in months. Main owner share
is the share of equity held by the principal owner (in percentage). Business (personal) delinquency is a
variable taking the value of 0,1,2,3 if the ﬁrm has been delinquent on business (personal) obligations zero,
one, two, three or more times, respectively. Age is expressed in years from the foundation. Monitoring
costs is the ratio (bank employees)/loans in the census region. R&D is the ratio (R&D expenditures)/sales
in the sector.
Variable P a n e lA :A l lﬁ r m s
Mean 25% 50% 75%
Loans concentration 0.813 0.580 1 1
Assets 1,243,267 28,000 127,040 731,966
Comovement 0.051 0.019 0.037 0.078
Rural location 001
Illiquid assets (share) 0.383 0.08 0.333 0.645
N. employees 29.870 2 6 27
N. suppliers/sales 8.01e-05 3.16e-06 1.61e-05 0.000496
One site 011
Length of Relations 84.414 32 60 112
Main owner share (%) 77.631 50 100 100
Age 14.948 6 12 20
Credit Card 011
Records 111
Monitor. Costs 0.00678 0.0057 0.0068 0.0071
R&D 0.0427 0.0075 0.0302 0.0637
Business delinquency 0.402 0 0 0
Personal delinquency 0.330 0 0 0
Bankruptcy 0.027 0 0 0
Variable Panel B: Firms with at least 1 lender
Mean 25% 50% 75%
Loans concentration 0.813 0.580 1 1
Assets 1,732,056 62,959 273,658 1,492,000
Comovement 0.053 0.02 0.037 0.08
Rural location 000
Illiquid assets 0.403 0.12 0.359 0.662
N. employees 39.790 4 10 50
N. suppliers/sales 5.96e-05 4.41e-06 1.52e-05 4.17e-05
One site 011
Length of Relations 84.414 32 60 112
Main owner share (%) 74.081 50 92 100
Age 15.212 6 12 20
Credit Card 001
Records 111
Monitoring Costs 0.00677 0.0057 0.0068 0.0071
R&D 0.0414 0.0075 0.0302 0.0637
Business delinquency 0.458 0 0 0
Personal delinquency 0.367 0 0 0
Bankruptcy 0.025 0 0 0
31Table 5: Estimating the Choice of Multiple Borrowing and the Degree of Dierentiation
The table reports estimation results for the subsample of ﬁrms with up to two lenders; ﬁrms with 5 or less employees are excluded. In each
panel, the ﬁrst column reports estimates for the ﬁrst-stage probit for the decision to borrow from dierentiated sources; the second column
reports the estimates for the second-stage decision of the degree of dierentiation. In the probit, the dependent variable is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the ﬁrm borrows from more than one lender. In the intensive margin, the dependent variable is the degree of concentration of the
loans obtained from the ﬁrm’s multiple lenders, as measured by the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index. Assets are in current dollars. Rural location,
one site, bankruptcy, records, and credit card are dummies taking the value of one if the ﬁrm has the speciﬁed characteristic. The length of
relations is expressed in months. Main owner share is the share of equity held by the principal owner (in percentage). Business (personal)
delinquency is a variable taking the value of 0,1,2,3 if the ﬁrm has been delinquent on business (personal) obligations zero, one, two, three or
more times, respectively. Age is expressed in years from the foundation. Monitoring costs is the ratio (bank employees)/loans in the census
region. R&D is the ratio (R&D expenditures)/sales in the sector. t-values are in parenthesis. All regressions include a constant term and a
dummy for 1998; ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10%.





































































































































































N. obs. 2,302 2,302 2154
N. uncensored 913 913 859
32Table 6: Robustness. Including Firms with more than Two Lenders and Very Small Firms
The table reports estimation results for ﬁrms with at least one lender, excluding ﬁrms with 5 or less employees (Panel A); estimation results
for ﬁrms with up to two lenders including the very small businesses (Panel B); estimation results for ﬁrms with at least one lender including
the very small businesses (Panel C). In each panel, the ﬁrst column reports estimates for the ﬁrst-stage probit for the decision to borrow from
dierentiated sources; the second column reports the estimates for the second-stage decision of the degree of dierentiation. In the probit, the
dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrm borrows from more than one lender. In the intensive margin, the dependent
variable is the degree of concentration of the loans obtained from the ﬁrm’s multiple lenders, as measured by the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index.
Assets are in current dollars. Rural location, one site, bankruptcy, records, and credit card are dummies taking the value of one if the ﬁrm
has the speciﬁed characteristic. The length of relations is expressed in months. Main owner share is the share of equity held by the principal
owner (in percentage). Business (personal) delinquency is a variable taking the value of 0,1,2,3 if the ﬁrm has been delinquent on business
(personal) obligations zero, one, two, three or more times, respectively. Age is expressed in years from the foundation. Monitoring costs is
the ratio (bank employees)/loans in the census region. R&D is the ratio (R&D expenditures)/sales in the sector. t-values are in parenthesis.
All regressions include a constant term and a dummy for 1998; ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10%.




































































































































































































N. obs. 2,586 2,859 3,375
N. uncensored 1,291 1,072 1,588
33Table 7: Robustness. Weighted Loans and Credit Lines
The table reports estimation results for all ﬁrms with at least one lender excluding the very small busi-
nesses (5 or less employees). In the estimates of Panel A, credit lines are attributed a weight twice that
attributed to other types of loans. In the estimates of Panel B, credit lines are attributed a weight of
one and other types of loans are attributed a weight of zero. In both panels, the ﬁrst column reports
estimates for the ﬁrst-stage probit for the decision to borrow from dierentiated sources; the second col-
umn reports the estimates for the second-stage decision of the degree of dierentiation. In the probit, the
dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrm borrows from more than one lender. In
the intensive margin, the dependent variable is the degree of concentration of the loans obtained from the
ﬁrm’s multiple lenders, as measured by the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index. Assets are in current dollars.
Rural location, one site, bankruptcy, records, and credit card are dummies taking the value of one if the
ﬁrm has the speciﬁed characteristic. The length of relations is expressed in months. Main owner share
is the share of equity held by the principal owner (in percentage). Business (personal) delinquency is a
variable taking the value of 0,1,2,3 if the ﬁrm has been delinquent on business (personal) obligations zero,
one, two, three or more times, respectively. t-values are in parenthesis. All regressions include a constant

















































































































N. obs. 2,756 2,302
Uncensored 1,367 1,709
34